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Abstract. The critical infrastructures of the nation such as the power grid and the
communication network are highly interdependent. Also, it has been observed that
there exists complex interdependent relationships between individual entities of the
power grid and the communication network that further obfuscates the analysis, and
mitigation of faults in such multi-layered networks. In recent years, the research
community has made significant efforts towards gaining insight and understanding
of the interdependency relations in such multi-layered networks, and accordingly,
a number of models have been proposed and analyzed towards realizing this goal.
In this chapter we study existing interdependency models proposed in the recent
literature and discuss their approach, and inherent features, towards modeling inter-
dependent multi-layer networks. We also provide a brief discussion into the draw-
backs of each of these models and propose an alternate model that addresses these
drawbacks by capturing the interdependency relationships using a combination of
conjunctive and disjunctive relations.
Keywords. Interdependent Network, Power Network, Communication Network,
Cascading Failure
1. Introduction
In the last few years there has been an increasing awareness in the research com-
munity that the critical infrastructures of the nation do not operate in isolation. In fact,
they are closely coupled with other infrastructures such that the well being of one infras-
tructure depends heavily on the well being of another. As an example, consider the in-
terdependent relationship between the power, communication, and transport networks as
shown in Figure 1 [1]. If we focus exclusively on the power and communication networks
we observe that entities of the power grid, such as the Supervisory Control and Data Ac-
quisition (SCADA) systems, that control power stations and sub-stations, are dependent
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on the communication network to receive their operational commands. While entities of
the communication network, such as routers and cell towers, are dependent on the power
grid to remain operational. Compounding the complexity of analysis of this symbiotic
relationship between the two networks, is the effect of cascading failures across these
networks. For instance, not only can entities of the power networks, such as generators
and transmission lines, trigger a power failure, but also communication network entities,
such as routers and optical fiber lines, can trigger failures in the power grid. Thus, it
is essential that the interdependency between different types of networks be understood
well, so that preventive measures can be taken to avoid cascading catastrophic failures in
such multi-layered network environments.
Figure 1. Interdependency between power, communication and transportation infrastructures
With the continued focus for developing realistic failure propagation models that
aid in analyzing, and mitigating the effects of cascading faults across the entities of the
multi-layered network, several failure propagation models have been studied that address
the interdependency relationship between power, and communication networks [3,7,8,9],
and space based networks [10].
In this chapter we present a survey of the existing interdependency models for criti-
cal infrastructure networks that have been proposed in the recent literature. In Section 2,
we present the models and draw attention to some of their limitations. In Section 3 we
outline the considerations that need to be taken into account for capturing the complex
interdependency that exists between power grid and communication networks in the real
world. In Section 4 we propose an alternative model that overcomes some of the limita-
tions of existing models by capturing the interdependency between the networks using
a combination of conjunctive and disjunctive relations. Finally, in Section 5 we present
concluding remarks.
2. Interdependency Models
2.1. Buldyrev et al. Interdependency Model
Motivated by the electricity blackout in Italy (2003) Buldyrev et al. [3] proposed a cas-
cading failure model for interdependent networks.
The power and communication infrastructures can be represented as networks.
These networks are depicted as two connected graphs P (for power network) and C (for
communication network) with same number of nodes. To represent the interdependency
between the networks, bidirectional links between P and C, termed as P↔C edges, are
considered with every node in each graph connected to exactly one node in the other
graph as shown in Figure 2(a). These bidirectional links represent the interdependency
relationship that a node in the power network is dependent on exactly one node in the
communication network and vice-versa. Thus capturing the fact that a failure of a node
in the power (communication) network causes the corresponding node in the commu-
nication (power) network to fail. Hence the interdependent power and communication
infrastructure can be represented as a network consisting of graphs P and C and P↔C
edges.
Failures are considered in the model when a fraction of the nodes from any of the two
graphs P, or C are removed. Upon the introduction of a failure in the graph P, the failed
nodes are removed and correspondingly, the nodes in the graph C that are connected via
P↔C edges to the attacked nodes are also removed. Parallel to the node removals, any
edge within graph P or C, or P↔C edges that do not have one node at each end point
are also simultaneously removed.
The cascade now proceeds as follows. In the first stage, the set of connected com-
ponents in the graph P is defined as p1 clusters. The set of C nodes connected to the
p1 clusters by P↔C edges are termed as c1 sets. Any edges in graph C, that connects
these c1 sets are removed. The set of connected components in graph C after this removal
of edges are defined as c2 clusters. In the second stage using same procedure as that to
find the c2 cluster and c1 sets, p2 sets (from c2 clusters and p3 clusters are obtained.
In subsequent stages this cascade process then oscillates between the two graphs until
a steady state is reached when no further removal of edges in the graphs are possible.
At the steady state, the interdependent network consists of mutually connected clusters.
Each mutually connected cluster consists of nodes having the properties (a) the nodes in
graphs P and C are completely connected, (b) each of these nodes which belong to the
graph P (C) has P↔C edge with graph C (P). Note that there exists no intra-links be-
tween any of the mutually connected clusters. An example demonstrating this cascading
process is shown in Figure 2.
The largest mutually connected cluster is defined as the cluster having the maximum
number of nodes. Given a fraction 1− p, (0 ≤ p ≤ 1) of nodes that are removed from
the interdependent network (due to a failure), the ratio P∞ defines the number of nodes
in the largest mutually connected cluster at the steady state, as compared to the initial
number of nodes in the network. For the purpose of simulation and study, the power
and communication networks are considered as, coupled scale free, Erdos Reyni [15],
and random networks. Different values of P∞ were computed by varying the values of
p, and the size of the network. It was observed that, above a percolation threshold pc,
the value of P∞ changes from the neighborhood of zero to the neighborhood of one for
Figure 2. The interdependent network shown consists of power network nodes p1, p2, p3 and p4 and commu-
nication network nodes c1, c2, c3 and c4. Blue and green edges represent intra links in power and communica-
tion network respectively and black edges represent the interdependency (inter links). In the respective figures
the cascading failure is demonstrated as follows — (a) Node p3 is attacked, (b) the node p3 and its intra links
are removed along with its interdependent node c3 and its intra link, (c) the intra link (c1,c4) is removed using
the cascade process defined. And finally, the steady state is reached comprising of two mutually connected
clusters with cluster 2 as the largest mutually connected cluster.
a given network size. From this observation the authors infer that when the fraction of
failed node is below 1− pc of the original number of nodes, the largest connected cluster
has a size approximately equal to the size of initial pre-failure network. The percolation
threshold pc for Erdos Reyni networks is validated by analytical results.
In subsequent papers, Buldyrev et al. extend their work from their original cascading
failure model (as discussed above), to interdependent networks with directional depen-
dency [4], and interdependency between more than one network [5].
One noticeable shortcoming of this model proposed by Buldyrev et al. is that it
does not distinguish between nodes in either network as separate entities. Nodes in the
power network may be functionally separate entities such as power plants, sub-stations,
and load nodes. Similarly, nodes in the communication network may be functionally
separate entities such as cell towers, and routers. When separate entities of the network
are considered, the proposed cascading model may not work in the same way as assumed
by the authors, and also the dependency relationship of one type of entity to the other
may not be able to be captured with this model. Another potential drawback to this
model is for the functionality of the mutually connected cluster. The mutually connected
clusters generated after the cascade may not be completely functional because of the
physical limitations of the network [16]. For example, the nodes from the power grid in
a mutually connected cluster may not be able to provide sufficient power to the nodes in
the communication network due to the limits on the power generation capacities. Thus,
it would be wrong to assume that the residual mutually connected clusters continue to be
functional after a cascade simply because they remain connected.
2.2. Rosato et al. Coupling Model
In [7], Rostato et al. model the power flow in the power grid, and the data flow in the
communication network separately. They then analyze the effect of failures in the com-
munication network, caused by failures in the power grid using a coupling model be-
tween the two infrastructures. Their analysis of the failure propagation is performed on
the backdrop of the Italian high voltage electric transmission network (HVIET), and the
high-bandwidth backbone of the Italian Internet network (GARR). Data for both the net-
works were gathered from documentation available in the public domain.
For modeling the power network, the HVIET network is represented by an undi-
rected graph consisting of three type of vertices, namely, source nodes (nodes that sup-
ply power to the network), load nodes (nodes that draw power out of the network), and
junction nodes (which neither draw nor supply power to network, but act as relays). The
edges of the graph corresponds to the transmission lines. The power flow dynamics in
the power grid relies on the DC power flow model as given by [12]. At every occurrence
of a failure of one or more nodes, or transmission lines (edges), the power flow dynamics
are recalculated using this model. It is to be noted here that the DC power flow model
considers the physical constraints pertaining to the maximum power flow possible over
a transmission line while computing the minimum load re-dispatch (reducing the power
drawn out by the load nodes) after a failure. The authors define the quality of service
(QoS) of the power network as the ratio of the change in the total power drawn by the
load nodes after the failure event, as compared to the total power drawn by the load nodes
before the failure event.
For modeling the communication network, the GARR network is represented as a
graph consisting of high-bandwidth backbone links as edges, and the Italian universities
and research institutions as nodes. For computing the total amount of traffic inflow into
the network, the probability that a node generates a packet λ , (0≤ λ ≤ 1) is considered
at each time step. For each generated packet a random node is chosen as its destination.
A probabilistic packet routing model is considered along the lines of [13] for sending the
packets to their intended destinations. The average delivery time is defined as the average
of the packet transmission time from source to destination over all packets delivered
correctly within a particular time interval. The average delivery time is then used as a
metric to define the efficiency of the network for a given value of λ .
The coupling between the two networks is achieved by associating a node from the
communication network to the closest load node from the power network (Euclidean
distance). Note that this coupling is one directional, that is, for a node to be operational
in the communication network it is dependent on a node from the power network, but
the power network node is not dependent on the communication node for its survival. In
a failure event, if a load node i that was initially extracting power P0i units, now extracts
Pi units of power after the subsequent load re-dispatching process. The communication
nodes coupled to i remain operational as long as the value of Pi is greater than or equal
to αP0i , (0≤ α ≤ 1). The coefficient α is termed as the strength of coupling between the
two networks.
The authors then use the above coupling model to analyze and simulate the effect
of random link failures in the power network for a fixed parameter of α (taken as α =
0.75). The main insight of their simulation is that even with small failure events in the
power (HVIET) network (small with respect to number of transmission lines failed), the
communication (GARR) network can get completely disconnected.
The individualized modeling of the power and communication network done by
Rostato et al. is realistic to a point, but the coupling model reflects only a one way de-
pendency model and fails to represent the interdependency that exists between power
and communication networks of today. This shortcoming may prohibit the accurate cas-
cading failure scenarios when the faults originate from the communication network and
cascade through to the power network.
2.3. Nguyen et al. Interdependency Model
In [8], Nguyen et al. propose a cascading model in similar lines of [3], and address the
problem for identifying the critical nodes in an interdependent network. In their model,
the power network, and communication network are considered as graphs Gs = (Vs,Es)
and Gc = (Vc,Ec), and the interdependency is represented by an unidirectional edge set
Esc that connect vertices from set Vs with set Vc in a composite graph containing this
edge set, and both the power, and communication networks graphs. A failure due to a
dependency relation is outlined by the assumption that, not only do the failed node(s)
cease to operate, but also the nodes connected to the failed nodes via edges from the
edge set Esc also become non-operational. Failures propagate in the following way: the
failed nodes and the incident edges to these nodes that belong to Gs (power network),
and Gc (communication network) are removed to generate G′s and G′c respectively. Then,
the largest connected components Ls and Lc are computed for the graphs G′s and G′c. Any
node ns ∈G′s that does not belong to Ls, and any node nc ∈G′c that does not belong to Lc
are considered non-operational. Failures due to the dependency relations are simultane-
ously considered, and propagation ensues until a steady state is reached when no further
nodes in either network can fail. An example showing this failure propagation is shown
in Figure 3.
Using the above defined failure propagation model, the authors consider the prob-
lem of identifying a set of critical nodes in the power network of size less than a positive
integer k, such that at the steady state the size of the largest connected component in
the power network is minimized. The authors show that this problem is NP-complete by
reduction from the decision version of the Maximum Independent Set problem, and infer
that this problem is in-approximable within a bound of 2− ε . Three greedy approxima-
tion algorithms are proposed by the authors for approximating the solution to this prob-
lem in polynomial time, namely, Maximum Cascade (Max-Cas), Iterative Interdependent
Centrality (IIC), and Hybrid.
The authors perform an extensive simulation of the proposed algorithms using three
different power network, and communication network data sets. The data sets considered
were (i) US Western States power network, and a synthetic scale free communication
network with an exponential factor, β = 2.2, (ii) Synthetic scale free power network
with β = 3.0, and a synthetic scale free communication network with β = 2.2, and (ii)
Scale free power and communication networks with the same β = 2.6. For each of the
simulations the interdependency relationship between the two networks were setup using
a random weighted permutation of nodes of the two networks.
In the simulations it was observed that the Hybrid algorithm takes lesser time and
has better performance bounds than the other two algorithms. In the process of the simu-
Figure 3. Power Network consisting of nodes p1,p2,p3,p4 and Communication Network consisting of nodes
c1,c2,c3,c4. Blue and green edges represents intra links in power and communication network respectively
and black edges represent the interdependency (interlinks). (a) The node p3 is attacked. (b) The intra links of
node p3 are removed due to its failure along with its interdependent node c3 in communication network and all
its associated intra links. (c) The node p1 fails as it is disconnected from the the largest connected component
in the power network. The steady state is reached with nodes p2 and p4 in power network as functional nodes
after the failure event.
lations, it was observed that when interdependent systems are loosely connected they are
more vulnerable to failure. Their observations also included that sparse interdependent
networks are more vulnerable to cascading failures. This was observed from simulations
carried out by varying the exponential factor of the scale free communication network,
while keeping the exponential factor of the power network, and the total number of nodes
constant. The simulations carried out by the authors by varying the total number of nodes
of both the networks, while keeping a fixed exponential factor of the considered scale
free networks, showed that large networks are more vulnerable to cascading failures.
The observable shortcomings of this model are similar to the drawbacks discussed
above for the model proposed by Buldyrev et al. [3]. Without the distinction of nodes in
the networks into separate entities, such as power plants, and substations, for the power
network, and cell towers, and routers for the communication network, the failure cas-
cading model may not represent the workings of real world networks. Thus hindering
the analysis, and mitigation of faults caused by cascading failures in multi-layer critical
infrastructure networks.
2.4. Parandehgheibi et al. Interdependency Model
Parandehgheibi et al. [9] also consider the power and communication infrastructure net-
works to analyze the effect of cascading failures on these interdependent networks. In
their model, the power network graph P = (Vp,Ep) consist of vertices Vp representing
the generators, and substations, and edges Ep representing the transmission lines. Simi-
larly, the communication network graph C = (Vc,Ec) consist of vertices Vc representing
the control centers, and routers, edges Ec representing the communication lines. In the
graphs, it is assumed that nodes represented by generators, and control centers, are au-
tonomous, i.e. these nodes operate independently without any dependency on any other
node across both the networks. In this model, dependency between network entities is
represented by coupling the routers, and substations with edges E (directed or undi-
rected), in a composite graph of G = (V,E,Ep,Ec),V = Vp∪Vc. Whether a node of this
composite graph G is operational or not is defined by the following functional rules: If
the node represents a substation, it remains operational as long as, (i) there exists a path
between the substation and a generator via the power network edges Ep, and (ii) there
exists a path between the substation and a router (to receive control signals) via edges of
E. If the node represents a router, it remains operational as long as, (i) there exists a path
between the router and a control center via the communication network edges Ec, and
(ii) there exists a path between the router and a substation (to receive power) via edges of
E. Lastly, if the node represents a generator, or a control center, it remains continuously
functional. At the time of the initial failure (due to a possible attack, or fault), the failed
nodes, or edges are removed from the graph G. The failure propagation is then repre-
sented in the model by iteratively removing the failed nodes and all their incident edges
from graph G that do not satisfy the aforementioned functional rules. This propagation
continues until a steady state is reached when no further removals of nodes, or edges are
necessary. An example of the described failure propagation is illustrated in Figure 4.
Keeping this failure model as their basis, the authors consider the problem of se-
lection of the minimum number of non-autonomous nodes (substations, and routers),
that need to be removed from the graph G, such that the resulting graph generated at
the steady state contains no non-autonomous nodes. The authors term this problem as
the Node-MTFR (minimum total failure removal) problem. They also identify another
similar problem Edge-MTFR, that concentrates on the selection of the minimum num-
ber of edges of G such that the resulting graph generated at the steady state contains no
non-autonomous node.
For solving these two problems the authors assume that the power network graph P,
and the communication network graph C, are each star topology graphs. For the power
network, the substations are directly connected to a generator without any connections
between any other substations, i.e for all edges (u,v) ∈ Ep, node u represents a substa-
tion, and node v represents a generator. Similarly for the communication network the
router are directly connected to a control center without any connections between any
other routers, i.e for all edges (u,v) ∈ Ec, node u represents a router node, and node v
represents a control center node. The authors now proceed to analyze the problem from
the perspective of a bipartite graph, where the nodes in the bipartite graph comprise of
the substations of the power network, and routers of the communication network (the
nodes representing generators, and control centers are ignored). The edges of this bipar-
tite graph is the set of dependency relations represented by edge set E, of graph G. The
authors analyze this problem from two interdependency perspectives, namely, unidirec-
tional interdependency, and bi-directional interdependency.
For unidirectional dependency, the Node-MTFR problem is shown to be NP-
complete by reduction from the Feedback Vertex Set problem, and an optimal solution
is proposed by an integer linear program (ILP). A greedy approximation algorithm is
also proposed for this problem and its solution is compared with the optimal solution ob-
Figure 4. The power network consists of a generator G and substations s1,s2,s3 and communication network
consists of control center C and routers r1,r2,r3. Blue edges denotes the power network edges (composed of
transmission lines) and green edges denotes the communication network edges (composed of communication
links). Black edges denotes the interdependency between substation of power network and routers in commu-
nication network. (a) The substation s1 is attacked. (b) Failure of substation s1 results in removal of all power
network edges incident on s1 and failure of interdependent router r1 and removal of communication network
edges incident on it. (c) Substations s2, s3 and routers r2, r3 fails and hence are removed as they do not satisfy
both the properties for being being functional as mentioned. The edges incident on these substations and routers
are subsequently removed. The resultant interdependent network after the failure consists of two autonomous
nodes G and C.
tained from the ILP. The authors also prove that Edge-MTFR problem for unidirectional
interdependency is NP-complete by reduction from the Feedback Edge Set problem.
For bidirectional interdependency, the authors show that the Node-MTFR problem
corresponds to a minimum vertex cover problem for bipartite graphs, and using Konig’s
Theorem, show that this problem is equivalent to the maximum matching problem for bi-
partite graphs which has a known polynomial time solvable algorithm [14]. Thus show-
ing that the Node-MTRFR problem for bidirectional interdependency is polynomially
solvable. The authors also observe that for the Edge-MTFR problem with bidirectional
interdependency all the edges of the bipartite graph must necessarily be removed, as any
existing edge would denote the existence of operating non-autonomous nodes.
For the purpose of experimentation and simulation, the authors use the Italian com-
munication and power network data obtained from [7]. To preserve the star topology
configuration for the power and communication networks, only substations directly con-
nected to the generators, and routers directly connected to control centers are considered.
Unidirectional dependency between the substations and routers is established by assum-
ing that a substation receives control signals from the nearest router, and a router receives
power from the nearest substation. Using this setup the simulation is carried out to find
the minimum number of nodes representing routers and substations that need to be re-
moved, such that all non-autonomous nodes are removed from the graph (Node-MTFR).
The experimental results showed that the north-western part of Italy is acutely vulnera-
ble as removal of just three routers results in the failure of all substations and remaining
routers.
A possible drawback to this model is that this model is able to represent depen-
dencies that are in disjunctive form, for example, a sub-station survives as long it has a
connection to a router. However, if there is a need to model a conjunctive dependency
among network entities this model may not be adequate, for example, a scenario where
a sub-station survives only when it is connected to two routers. In the real world, it is
highly likely that entities in either the power or communication network have such con-
junctive dependency amongst other entities, which this model may not be able to ade-
quately represent. Another possible shortcoming of this model is the number of types
of power, and communication entities that this model considers. For instance, in a real
world communication network there may be communication entities such as cell towers
whose survivability may have to be modeled very differently than the way routers are
modeled. In the proposed model if support for additional entities are included that have
different functional rules, it is not clear how this model will be able to accommodate
them.
2.5. Castet et al. Interdependency Model
In [10], Castet et al. develop a model for survivability analysis of networks with het-
erogeneous nodes (nodes that can perform more than one function), and apply their ap-
proach to space-based networks. The authors propose that heterogeneous networks can
be modeled as interdependent multi-layer networks, thus enabling survivability analysis
of these networks. They assert that in this approach, the multi-layer aspect captures the
common functionalities across the different nodes (by construction of homogeneous sub-
networks), and the interdependency aspect captures the physical characteristics of each
node in the network.
In this paper the authors focuses on space-based networks (SBNs). In SBNs, each
network entity (space-craft), may perform more than one function. SBN’s operate by
physically distributing functions in multiple orbiting space-crafts that are wirelessly con-
nected to each other. The SBNs architecture allows the sharing of resources on-orbit,
such as data processing, data storage, and downlinks among the network entities. In this
study, Castet et al. attempt to assess their proposed approach of modeling heterogeneous
networks as interdependent multi-layer networks on SBNs, and benchmark the surviv-
ability of a fractionated SBN architecture, against that of a traditional monolith space-
craft.
To represent the heterogeneous SBN as a multi-layer interdependent network the
authors define the following terms:
• Super-Node: A network entity that supports multiple functionalities
• Node: Component of a super-node that represents a single functionality of that
super-node
• Layer: Set of nodes with the same functionality
• Intra-Layer Link: A link between two nodes in the same layer. The link can be
directed (when one node is providing a resource and the other is receiving), or
undirected (both provide, and receive resources)
• Networked Layer: A network possessing intra-layer links
• Inter-Layer Link: A directed link that captures the inter-dependency between
functionalities (nodes) within a super-node. Specifically, this link implies the (di-
rected) propagation of failure from one node to the other.
In their model two types of inter-layer links are considered that represent the two
types of failure propagation possible in the model: (i) Inter-links for the kill effect failure
propagation, defined by the propagation rule as follows: When a node fails, all nodes
that have an incoming inter-link of this type from the failed node immediately fail, and
(ii) Inter-links for the precursor effect failure propagation, defined by a conditional prop-
agation rule as follows: When a node fails, and all the nodes with incoming intra-links
to this failed node have also failed, all entities that have an incoming inter-link of this
type from the failed node fails. This type of inter-link implicitly implies that as long as a
super-node has access to a particular functionality, either from its own resources or from
another super-node, all nodes in the super-node dependent on this functionality survive.
Figure 5 demonstrates the propagation rules and represents a sample SBN as an
interdependent multi-layer network N defined by N(G1, ...,GL,Ek,Ep), where:
L is the number o f layers each numbered sequentially f rom 1 to L
G1, ....,GL are the graphs on each layer :
∀l ∈ [1, ...,L],Gl = (Vl ,El)with :{
Vl is the set o f nl nodes in Gl
El is the set o f intra− layer links in Gl
Ek is the set o f inter− layer links representing the ”kill e f f ect”
Ep is the set o f inter− layer links representing the ”precursor e f f ect”
To analyze the survivability of an interdependent multi-layer network using the
above network representation, and propagation rules, the authors carry out the follow-
ing steps: (i) Generate the time to failure for each node and intra-layer link, (ii) propa-
gate failures through inter-layer links for the kill effect, (iii) propagate failures through
inter-layer links for the precursor effect, and (iv) combine all failure propagation effects
to obtain the probability of failure of each node. Random times to failure for the nodes
were generated using cumulative distribution functions representing the failure behavior
of each node. Since links between two space-crafts (super-nodes) is established through
a wireless unit, a two step process was followed for generating the times to failure for the
intra-layer links: (i) times to failure of the wireless units on each spacecraft was gener-
ated using predetermined cumulative distribution functions, (ii) times to failures for each
intra-layer link was generated by taking the minimum of the time to failures of the two
associated wireless units.
For simulation and study, the authors apply their model into three different SBN
scenarios. In their first scenario they consider three different space network architectures.
The first architecture considered consists of a traditional monolith spacecraft with three
subsystems (or layers), namely, Telemetry Tracking and Command (TTC), supporting
subsystems, and payload. The second architecture consists of two space based networks,
one of them a traditional monolith spacecraft, while the other spacecraft consists of two
subsystems — TTC and supporting subsystems. The two spacecrafts shares their TTC
subsystems, i.e. a TTC redundancy is introduced, through a wireless link. This architec-
Figure 5. Interdependent space based network consisting of three layers represented by graphs
G1 = ({1,2},{(1,2),(2,1)}), G2 = ({3,4}, /0), G2 = ({5}, /0). Edge set Ek = {(3,1),(3,5),(4,2)} and edge
set Ep = {(1,3),(1,5),(2,4)}. If node 3 fails, nodes 1 and 5 immediately fail (kill effect). If node 1 fails then
nodes 3 and 5 don’t fail unless node 2 also fails (precursor effect).
ture is shown in Figure 5 with layer 1,2 and 3 denoting subsystems TTC, supporting sub-
systems, and payload respectively. A third architecture is considered which is comprised
of the monolith spacecraft, and two spacecrafts having two subsystems — TTC and sup-
porting subsystems. These three spacecrafts share there TTC subsystems, i.e. there is a
higher degree of TTC redundancy, through wireless links. Wireless links in the second
and third spacecraft architecture are assumed to be perfect. The distribution of probabil-
ity of unavailability (failure) of TTC subsystem with time, identified as a major space-
craft unreliability factor in [19], is obtained from [18]. The probability of unavailability
of the payload subsystem over time, for the three spacecrafts is computed considering
the failure of the TTC subsystem using a Monte Carlo Simulation. The simulation re-
sults showed that for a given time, increasing the redundancy of the TTC subsystems
reduces the probability of unavailability of the payload. However, it was observed that
the percentage of this reduction is not linear with the redundancy introduced.
The second scenario was aimed to study the impact of wireless link failure. A
Weibull distribution is considered for probability of unavailability of wireless link failure
with time. The parameters of Weibull distribution are set such that the wireless link has
a probability of 0.5 to fail after 15 years. Simulations were carried out to compute the
probability of unavailability of payload for the second architecture of the first application
with the given wireless link failure distribution. The result is compared with the first and
second architecture with perfect wireless link (the previous scenario). Compared with
the first scenario, it was observed that for the second architecture the probability of un-
availability of payload increases with time when wireless link failure is considered. At a
given point in time, it surpasses the probability of unavailability of monolith spacecraft
thus negating the effect of a TTC redundancy. The conclusion that can be drawn from
these observations are that failure behavior of wireless links is a critical consideration to
analyze the advantage of space based networks with TTC redundancy, over adoption of
traditional monolith space crafts.
In the third scenario the authors consider a more complex space based network by
including two new subsystems into the traditional monolith spacecraft. The new subsys-
tems included are a Control Processor (CP) subsystem (the main computer of the space-
craft), and a Data Handling (DH) subsystem (handling exchange and storage of data).
Another space craft is considered with all the subsystems as stated except the payload.
These two spacecrafts share DH, TTC and CP subsystems, thus introducing redundancy.
The resources are shared via wireless links. Hence the space based network represented
by this architecture has 5 layers with 3 networked layer. The distribution of probability
of unavailability of these subsystems with time is obtained from [18]. Assuming per-
fect wireless link, a Monte Carlo simulation is carried out to compute the probability of
unavailability of payload with time. The simulation result is compared with traditional
monolith spacecraft, and the second spacecraft architecture’s (from the first scenario)
payload failure distribution. It is observed that after 15 years this architecture reduces the
risk of failure by 20.5% over the monolith spacecraft. This makes way to draw a conclu-
sion that this architecture has greater improvement in reduction of failure over monolith
spacecraft, than by only introducing TTC redundancy (as considered in first scenario).
3. Limitations of Current Modeling Approaches and Possible Solutions
As discussed in the previous section, significant efforts have been made in the research
community in the last few years to develop an appropriate model of interdependency
between the entities of a multi-layer critical infrastructure network [3,4,5,7,6,10,9,11,8,
23,21]. Unfortunately, many of the proposed models are overly simplistic in nature and as
such they fail to capture the complex interdependency that exists between power grid and
communication networks. As noted in section 2.1, the highly cited paper due to Buldyrev
et al. [3], assume that every node in one network can depend on one and only one node
of the other network. Obviously, this assumption is not valid in an interdependent power-
communication network that spans countries and continents, Even the authors in a follow
up paper [5] recognize that the assumption may not be valid in the real world and a single
node in one network may depend on more than one node in the other network and vice-
versa. A node in one network may be functional (“alive”) as long as one supporting node
on the other network is functional.
Although this generalization can account for disjunctive dependency of a node in the
A network (say ai) on more than one node in the B network (say, b j and bk), implying
that ai may be “alive” as long as either bi or b j is alive, it cannot account for conjunctive
dependency of the form when both b j and bk has to be alive in order for ai to be alive. In
a real network the dependency is likely to be even more complex involving both disjunc-
tive and conjunctive components. For example, ai may be alive if (i) b j and bk and bl are
alive, or (ii) bm and bn are alive, or (iii) bp is alive. The graph based interdependency
models proposed in the literature [4,7,6,10,9,8] including [3,5] cannot capture such com-
plex interdependency between entities of multi-layer networks. In order to capture such
complex interdependency, we propose recently a new model of interdependency using
Boolean logic [20]. In the following, we briefly describe this model.
We outline the model for an interdependent network with two layers. However, the
concept can easily be generalized to deal with networks with more layers. Suppose that
the network entities in layer 1 are referred to as the A type entities, A = {a1, . . . ,an} and
entities in layer 2 are referred to as the B type entities, B = {b1, . . . ,bm}. If the layer 1
entity ai is operational if (i) the layer 2 entities b j,bk,bl are operational, or (ii) bm,bn are
operational, or (iii) bp is operational, we express it in terms of Live Equations of the form
ai ← b jbkbl + bmbn + bp. The Live Equation for a B type entity br can be expressed in
a similar fashion in terms of A type entities. If br is operational if (i) the layer 1 entities
as,at ,au,av are operational, or (ii) aw,az are operational, we express it in terms of Live
Equations of the form br ← asatauav + awaz. It may be noted that the live equations
only provide a necessary condition for entities such as ai or br to be operational. In
other words, ai or br may fail independently and may be not operational even when the
conditions given by the corresponding live equations are satisfied. A live equation in
general will have the following form:
xi←
Ti
∑
j=1
t j
∏
k=1
y j,k
where xi and y j,k are elements of the set A (B) and B (A) respectively, Ti represents the
number of min-terms in the live equation and t j refers to the size of the j-th min-term
(the size of a min-term is equal to the number of A or B elements in that min-term). In
the example ai ← b jbkbl + bmbn + bp, Ti = 3, t1 = 3, t2 = 2, t3 = 1, xi = ai, y2,1 = bm,
y2,2 = bp.
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a1← b1 +b2 b1← a1 +a2a3
a2← b1b3 +b2 b2← a1 +a3
a3← b1b2b3 b3← a1a2
a4← b1 +b2 +b3 −−
Table 1. Life Equations for a Multi-layer Network
Entities Time Steps
t0 t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6
a1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
a2 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
a3 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
a4 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
b1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
b2 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
b3 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table 2. Time Stepped Cascade Effect for a Multi-layer Network
We refer to the live equations of the form ai ← b jbkbl + bmbn + bp as First Order
Dependency Relations also, because these relations express direct dependency of the A
type entities on B type entities and vice-versa. It may be noted however that as A type en-
tities are dependent on B type entities, which in turn depends on A type entities, failure of
some A type entities can trigger failure of other A type entities, though indirectly through
some B type entities. Such interdependency creates a cascade of failures in multi-layered
networks when only a few entities of either A type or B type (or a combination) fails. We
illustrate this with the help of an example. The live equations for this example is shown
in Table 1.
As shown in Table 2, in this example the failure of only one entity a1 at time step t0
triggered a chain of failures that resulted in the failure of all the entities of the network
after by timestep t4. A table entry of 1 indicates that the entity is “dead”. In this example,
(a) Cascading failures reach steady state after p
time steps
(b) Cascading failures as a fixed point system
Figure 6. Cascading Failures in Multi-layered Networks
the failure of a1 at t0 triggered the failure of b3 at t1, which in turn triggered the failure
of a3 at t2. The failure of b3 at t1 was due to the dependency relation b3 ← a1a2 and
the failure of a3 at t2 was due to the dependency relation a3 ← b1b2b3. The cascading
failure process initiated by failure (or death) of a subset of A type entities at timestep
t = 0, A0d and a subset of B type entities B
0
d till it reaches its final steady state is shown
diagrammatically in Figure 6(a). Accordingly, a multi-layered network can be viewed as
a “closed loop” control system as shown in Figure 6(b). Finding the steady state after an
initial failure in this case is equivalent of computing the fixed point of a function F(.)
such that F(Apd ∪Bpd) = Apd ∪Bpd , where p represents the number of steps when the system
reaches the steady state.
We define a set of k entities in a multi-layered network as most vulnerable if failure
of these k entities triggers the failure of the largest number of other entities. The goal of
the k most vulnerable nodes in multi-layered network problem is to identify this set of
nodes. This is equivalent to identifying A0d ⊆ A, B0d ⊆ B, that maximizes |Apd ∪Bpd |, subject
to the constraint that |A0d ∪B0d |= k.
The dependency relations (live equations) can be formed either after careful analysis
of the multi-layer network along the lines carried out in [21], or after consultation with
the engineers of the local utility and internet service providers.
Utilizing this comprehensive model, we provide techniques to identify the k most
vulnerable nodes of an interdependent multi-layered network system in [20], so that pre-
ventive measures can be taken to strengthen the network. We show that the this problem
can be solved in polynomial time for some special cases, whereas for some others, the
problem is NP-complete. We also show that this problem is equivalent to computation of
a fixed point [22] of a closed loop system and we provide a technique utilizing Integer
Linear Programming to compute that fixed point. Finally, we present the efficacy of our
technique using real data collected from power grid and communication networks that
span the Maricopa county of Arizona in [20].
4. Conclusion
In order to build a robust and resilient system, a deep understanding of the complex
interdependency that exists between critical infrastructures such as the power grid and
the communication network is essential. Unfortunately, many of the proposed models are
unable to capture such complex interdependency. In our opinion, the model proposed in
[20] is a step in the right direction. However many problems, including the problem of
model validation, still remain open. These problems will most likely draw the attention
of the researchers in this domain for many years to come.
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